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The year 1992 may well be remembered
in Fiji as one of unexpected develop-
ments in the political arena, dominated
by the general election in May. The
first half of the year was consumed by
the election campaign and the second
half by its problematic reverberations.
It ended with a promise to take Fiji
away from the politics of racial divi-
sion toward a multiracial government
of national unity. Whether, and if, that
occurs will be the challenge of 1993.
The general election, the sixth since
independence in 1970 and the first since
the coups of 1987, was preceded by a
long and sometimes bitter campaign
(see my article, this issue). Political
fragmentation in the Fijian community
accompanied the emergence of a num-
ber of political parties and the rise of
provincialism. An intense and at times
bitter struggle for the prime minister-
ship was fought by Major General
Sitiveni Rabuka and Josevata Kami-
kamica, a technocrat and finance min-
ister in Ratu Mara's interim adminis-
tration. Division also plagued the
Indo-Fijian community as the coalition
between the National Federation and
Fiji Labour parties collapsed over dif-
ferences concerning how best to repeal
a constitution that effectively reduced
it to a political underclass.
The Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni
Taukei, a political party headed by
Rabuka and sponsored by the chiefs,
won 30 of the 37 Fijian communal
seats, the Fijian National United Front
5, and Independents 2 seats. The Gen-
eral Voters Party, representing all non-
Fijians and non-Indo-Fijians, won all
the 5 seats allocated to that community.
In an unexpectedly close contest, the
National Federation Party won 14 of
the 27 seats allocated to the Indo-Fijian
community, with the Fiji Labour Party
securing 13. The Soqosoqo ni Vakavu-
lewa ni Taukei was able to form a gov-
ernment after entering into a coalition
with the General Voters Party and with
the support of the Fijian National
United Front. Sitiveni Rabuka became
prime minister after Labour threw its
support behind him rather than Kami-
kamica, who was backed by the
National Federation Party.
Labour's strategy took supporters
completely by surprise. Its leaders
argued that Rabuka was a changed
man who appeared to be a genuine
friend of the poor of all races. They
said he was an essentially decent man
who had been used by some chiefs and
other vested interests to execute the
coup. Kamikamica, on the other hand,
was the principal architect of economic
policies that had eroded workers' rights
and brought them much misery. More-
over, he was Mara's man, enough to
disqualify him in their eyes.
Most important, Rabuka had given
Labour leaders a written undertaking
to act expeditiously on matters of con-
cern to them. These included reviewing
the racially based constitution, which
discriminates against Indo-Fijians,
urban Fijians, and western Fijians;
revoking the anti-labour legislation
passed by the interim administration;
abolishing the 15 percent value added
tax on most goods and services; and
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discussing the extension of the expiring
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants
Ordinance under which Fijian land is
leased by Indo-Fijian tenants. Rabuka
backed his commitment with suitable
rhetoric: "No longer am I promoting
the aspirations we had in 1987; now it
is for all races in Fiji" (WPR, 15 June
1992).
In retrospect, becoming prime min-
ister was a relatively easy task for
Rabuka; delivering on promises to var-
ious constituencies and running a
smooth administration proved more
problematic. The source of many of his
problems was the way in which
Rabuka had risen to the top. Although
popular among many ordinary Fijians
throughout the country (his power
base), Rabuka's support in the parlia-
mentary group of the Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei was suspect, as
members hedged their bets or were oth-
erwise divided in their loyalties.
To consolidate his support, Rabuka
rewarded most of his close and espe-
cially wavering supporters with minis-
terial and subministerial portfolios, in
the process creating the biggest minis-
terial government in Fiji's history.
Opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy
called the expansion to twenty-five
ministers "an exercise in political expe-
diency by way of jobs for the boys"
(TR, Dec 1992). One of the first bills
introduced by the government called
for an increase in salary for parliamen-
tarians. The haste with which the bill
was passed provoked much comment
in the country. The politics of patron-
age worked, at least for the time being,
but some in the Fijian camp, such as
Senator Adi Finau Tabakaucoro, a
Mara loyalist, kept the anti-Rabuka
flame alive, capitalizing on a series of
embarrassing setbacks for the govern-
ment. As the year ended, there was
some speculation about Rabuka's
political future.
Rabuka moved early to deliver on
his promises to the taukei, the indige-
nous Fijians, announcing measures
designed to enhance their participation
in education and the private sector.
These included increasing the govern-
ment scholarship fund for Fijians;
establishing a small business agency to
advise and train potential Fijian entre-
preneurs; providing financial assis-
tance to the provincial councils and the
Council of Rotuma to buy more shares
in Fijian Holdings Limited, and giving
that investment agency priority in
purchasing shares from privatized gov-
ernment commercial enterprises; and
considering tax exemption for Fijian-
owned businesses for up to twenty
years. Labour denounced the measures
as "just an extension of the haphazard
Alliance manner of dealing with Fijian
problems," and as measures "intended
for the rich and elite Fijians" (FT, 27
Aug 1992). Many Fijians, Nationalist
leader Sakiasi Butadroka among them,
also were skeptical of the benefits of
the government's proposals for ordi-
nary Fijians. The National Federation
Party predictably raised the issue of the
needs and aspirations of poor Indo-
Fijians, for whom the government's
policies showed scant sympathy.
In its first few weeks, the new gov-
ernment functioned more smoothly
than many had predicted or desired.
But it was soon embroiled in a series of
embarrassing incidents that under-
mined its prestige. In August, the
newly appointed minister of state for
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Indian Affairs, Himmat Lodhia, was
forced to resign after the police
launched an investigation into his com-
pany for the disappearance from the
customs bond of F$67,000 of imported
jewelry. A month before, Minister for
Information Ilaia Kuli was mired in a
messy strike at Fiji Posts and Telecom-
munications over the sacking of the
chief executive, Emori Naqova, and
the ensuing conflict between the work-
ers, who supported Naqova, and the
management board. The strike was
resolved only after the workers sabo-
taged fiber optics and compact cables,
throwing Suva and international com-
munications into chaos. And questions
were raised about the F$6so,000 pur-
chase price of the prime minister's
house when the government's own
valuer had estimated its value at
F$46S,000. The house was owned by
Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau's family com-
pany, Qeleni Holdings (FT, 30 Sept
1992).
All these incidents paled into insig-
nificance beside the so-called Stephens
affair. Tony Stephens, a local business-
man with previous encounters with the
law, had been detained for forty days
in 1988 on the charge of illegally
importing pen pistols. He was eventu-
ally cleared, and retaliated by demand-
ing F$30 million compensation for
wrongful arrest and detention. On 17
September, Attorney General Apitaia
Seru settled out of court for F$IO
million. Stephens was to be paid
F$980,000 in cash, and have his mort-
gage with the Home Finance Company
and the National Bank ofFiji paid off.
The receiving order and bankruptcy
action against him were to be dis-
charged, and he was to be allowed to
gain control of the Soqulu Plantation in
Taveuni from the National Bank. Even
more incredible, the deed of settlement
was to be exempt from income, land
sales, and value-added taxes (FT, I Oct
1992).
The settlement fell through when
the National Bank refused to honor the
deed signed by Seru. Soon afterward,
the whole affair was exposed in parlia-
ment. Jai Ram Reddy called the deed
an "attempt to swindle the govern-
ment," a case of gross corruption and
incompetence, and pressed for a judi-
cial inquiry. The attorney general, he
said, had acted without proper parlia-
mentary approval and in contravention
of the convention which required that
damages be paid after taking into
account the state's ability to pay.
Rabuka denied the charge of cor-
ruption but described Seru's action as
"a very sad case of error of judgement."
The government rejected the opposi-
tion's call for a judicial inquiry with the
power to make binding recommenda-
tions, but agreed to appoint a parlia-
mentary commission of inquiry. Seru
resigned and was replaced by Kelemedi
Bulewa, whose law firm Seru subse-
quently joined. In December, the high
court rejected Stephens' application to
have the deed declared valid. The mat-
ter is unlikely to rest there. Whatever
follows, the Stephens affair has already
tarnished the reputation of the govern-
ment, leaving the vague suspicion that
more people were involved than is
presently known. As a Fiji Times edito-
rial put it, "the sorry mess suggests
powerful forces, answerable to no one
but themselves, are at work to under-
mine constitutional authority" (FT, I
Oct 1992).
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The government fared slightly better
on the international scene. In July,
Rabuka attended his first South Pacific
Forum meeting in Honiara. Although
understandably apprehensive about his
reception, he was warmly welcomed by
regional colleagues. He proclaimed the
Forum "a good outfit," and of his own
role as a "new boy on the block" he
said, "I come in and sit and listen and
contribute when I have to. The best
guide is if you have nothing to say, say
nothing" (PIM, Aug-Sept 1992). How-
ever, he did assure the leaders that Fiji's
regional stance was essentially the
same as it had been under Mara, and
he pledged Fiji's continued commit-
ment to the security of regional institu-
tions.
Rabuka made an equally successful
state visit to Australia to open a trade
and investment promotional campaign
in Sydney (Lako Mai Fiji) and to
restore full diplomatic and military ties
with Australia. He found a willing
counterpart in Paul Keating, who not
only restored full relations but also dis-
patched Defence Minister Robert Ray
to Fiji in October. The Australian pub-
lic is now largely indifferent to the
prospects for democracy in Fiji, but
many Labour supporters there and in
Fiji thought the Australian govern-
ment's apparently unconditional resto-
ration of full diplomatic and military
ties with Fiji was premature. As an edi-
torial in the Fiji-based magazine
Islands Business Pacific stated, "The
haste with which Australia wants to
restore relations with the Fiji army, as
if everything is back to normal again, is
deplorable. Fiji is not back to normal"
(IBP, Aug-Sept 1992). Rabuka repeated
his theme of Fiji returning to normality
at the United Nations' General Assem-
bly in October.
Just when his stature seemed to be
improving, Rabuka found himself in
trouble again. In an interview with an
Australian television channel in Sep-
tember, Rabuka remarked, apparently
unaware of the rolling cameras, that
his assurances to the Australian public
about his commitment to restoring Fiji
to democracy were a gimmick. "That
was the television me," he said. "The
real me" was a Fijian nationalist at
heart. "We want a constitution that's
totally Fijian-oriented." Asked if it
would be better if the Indo-Fijian pop-
ulation was deported to India, he said
"Yes," though he added-and this was
edited out-that was not his govern-
ment's intention. Further, he said that
the Labour Party "didn't do their
homework" on the issue of constitu-
tional review. "We can't do it before the
end of seven years," as stipulated in the
constitution (CT, 1 Oct 1992). The
interview caused an uproar in Fiji,
leading the National Federation Party
to stage a one-day boycott of parlia-
ment. Rabuka attempted to excuse his
remarks by insisting that he was mis-
quoted, but his explanation left most
people unconvinced, reinforcing the
impression of the prime minister as a
man who could not be trusted to honor
his commitments.
His remarks certainly dismayed
leaders of the Labour Party, who had
by this time become thoroughly disillu-
sioned with Rabuka. When Labour
made the deal with Rabuka, its leaders
saw themselves as the real winners, the
tail that would wag the dog. They were
mistaken; once ensconced, Rabuka
procrastinated. The value added tax
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was introduced unchanged; the draco-
nian labor laws remained on the
books, though they were largely unen-
forced; little movement was evident on
the matter of land leases; and there was
delay on the issue of constitutional
review. However, he balked when
Labour threatened to reconsider its
support for the government (FT, 2 Oct
1992), and talked of participating in a
vote of no confidence in it.
In November, Rabuka announced
preliminary steps toward reviewing the
constitution. The review would be car-
ried out by a bipartisan parliamentary
constitutional commission made up of
members of both houses (the House of
Representatives and the Senate) as well
as leaders of political parties outside it.
The review would use "a consensus-
building approach" with the 1990 con-
stitution as the basic reference point,
not the 1970 independence constitu-
tion, as the opposition parties wanted.
Although the parliament will be closely
associated with the review process, the
views of the chiefs and the Fijian peo-
ple generally will carry weight. As
Rabuka said, "If we are to move for-
ward with the review it is absolutely
essential that the government should
first secure the full support and under-
standing of the Fijian and Rotuman
communities through the Bose Levu
Vakaturaga [Great Council of Chiefs]"
(FT, 21 Nov 1992). No time frame has
been set for carrying out the review. It
may well be completed within the
seven-year period stipulated in the con-
stitution, as Rabuka wants, but not
earlier, as the opposition Indo-Fijian
parties demand.
Early in December, Rabuka stunned
the nation once again with a dramatic
proposal for a government of national
unity. "Be bloody bold and resolute,"
he said during the budget debate. "We
have to do it now and that is a formal
challenge and invitation to all political
leaders on the other side." If the pro-
posal was unacceptable, he said, he
was prepared to step down (FT, 5 Dec
1992). He provided no details of how
the power-sharing arrangement would
work or how the proposal was viewed
by his own party. In typical Rabuka
fashion, his offer seems to have been
made on the spur of the moment with-
out much forethought. Nonetheless,
the opposition parties welcomed the
prime minister's gesture and promised
to cooperate with him. At the same
time many viewed his proposal skepti-
cally. Why the offer now, when
Rabuka had rejected the idea during
the elections? Having Indo-Fijians in
government, he had said then, would
mean a loss of face for Fijians. What
happened to his "Fiji for Fijians" rheto-
ric, and his oft-repeated pledge to real-
ize the aims of the coups? asked the
skeptics.
Some saw the government of
national unity proposal as an exercise
in political survival. With support in
the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
suspect, his government mired in scan-
dals, and the opposition parties
demanding prompt fulfillment of
promises to them, the proposal
brought him much-needed breathing
space, "something to grasp as his lead-
ership sinks into uncertainty," accord-
ing to Dr Tupeni Baba (FT, 5 Dec 1992).
In this view there was no change of
heart, just a change of tactics. That
certainly was the hope of the Taukei
Movement, or what was left of it,
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MUCH OF this review is based on my
field notes, personal correspondence,
and accounts in newspapers and news-
letters such as Canberra Times (eT),
Fiji Times (FT), The Review (TR),
Islands Business Pacific (IBP), Washing-
ton Pacific Report (WPR), and Pacific
Islands Monthly (PIM).
which urged Rabuka to "completely
reject and throw out of the window
with precipitated [sic] haste the devilish
concept of government of national
unity" (FT, 22 Dec 1992). The Fijian
National United Front supported the
idea but on the condition that Fijian
interests always remain paramount.
Many members of Rabuka's own party
agreed that non-Fijian parties will be
junior partners in any government of
national unity.
How, or if, the idea of a government
of national unity will work will be a
major challenge for 1993. Another,
tragically, will be coping with the con-
sequences of devastating floods, the
worst in nearly fifty years, which hit
the country soon after Christmas,
wrecking the economy and the infra-
structure and causing damage esti-
mated in the millions. The devastation
came just as the economy was showing





Leaders of the Front de liberation
nationale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS)
had set 1992 as the date of the first
assessment of the Matignon Accords.
There were many meetings of the vari-
ous pro-independence parties during
the year, although final results will not
be known until after the FLNKS conven-
tion in mid-January 1993, and the
meeting of the Matignon Accords mon-
itoring committee scheduled for late
January or early February 1993.
The month of March represented a
dark period for the territory. While the
first two cyclones of the season, Betsy
in January and Daman in February,
had narrowly missed New Caledonia
and caused only minor damage,
Cyclone Esau hit squarely during the
night of 4 March. It was followed less
than a week later by Cyclone Fran.
These storms caused considerable
destruction, particularly in the North
Province.
As residents reeled under the impact
of Cyclone Fran, they learned of the
death at age forty-six of Jacques
Iekawe, the man in charge of the eco-
nomic development of the territory. In
1991 he had been appointed secretary-
general of the South Pacific Commis-
sion. The territory, metropolitan
France, and the whole Pacific region
were unanimous in their tributes.
The Prisunic-Barrau shopping cen-
ter, one of the oldest established com-
mercial centers in Noumea, was
burned and looted on the night of 13
March following a violent outburst
outside a local nightclub. This was per-
ceived by most observers as a sign of
growing dissatisfaction among a young
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-predominantly Melanesian-seg-
ment of the population, which feels
excluded from the benefits of the
Matignon Accords.
In September, two elections were
held, a week apart. On 20 September,
New Caledonian voters, along with all
other French citizens, expressed their
opinions in a referendum on the Maas-
tricht Treaty concerning the future of
the European Economic Community.
No real political campaign on this issue
was mounted in the territory and,
apart from televised statements by met-
ropolitan French political parties, few
utterances were made by local politi-
cians to induce voters to participate.
Only about a third of the registered
voters turned out at the polls, a bare
majority of whom opposed ratification
(5°.32 percent). The South Province
had the highest turnout (44.2 percent
of registered voters), and returned a
53.3 percent vote against. In the North
and Islands provinces, while voter par-
ticipation was lower (20.5 percent and
8.8 percent respectively), the outcome
was in favor of ratification of the treaty
(6r.5 percent and 72.7 percent respec-
tively). Following the No vote of the
South Province, some members of the
Union caledonienne faction of the
FLNKS, which had left its followers free-
dom of choice, later regretted that the
independence movement had not taken
a firmer stand during the campaign.
On 27 September, a more exclusive
set of voters (known as the greater elec-
tors) made up of members of parlia-
ment and representatives of municipal
councils, were called on to choose the
territory's representative to the French
Senate. Three candidates were compet-
ing for the post. Although incumbent
senator Dick Ukeiwe, member of the
Rassemblement pour la Caledonie dans
la Republique (RPCR, the largest anti-
independence party), had expressed his
intention of running for another term,
his party's nomination committee pre-
ferred to put forward Simon Loueck-
hote, current president of the Territo-
rial Congress. Dick Ukeiwe decided to
run anyway, with the support of the
smaller anti-independence group Cale-
donie demain (Caledonia Tomorrow).
The other anti-independence parties
gave their support to the RPCR candi-
date, with the Front caledonien calling
for blank ballots in the first round of
voting. At the other end of the political
spectrum, the FLNKS nominated Rock
Wamytan, a member of its largest fac-
tion, the Union caledonienne, the man
responsible for the external relations of
the FLNKS. Rock Wamytan enjoyed the
support of Nidoish Naisseline's Kanak
Socialist Liberation party, and of
Michel Hema's Union oceanienne.
After the second round of voting Simon
Loueckhote was declared the winner
with 192 votes, against 188 for Rock
Wamytan and 5 for Dick Ukeiwe, with
3 invalid ballots. The two major candi-
dates had been neck and neck after the
first round of voting, with 172 votes
each, while Dick Ukeiwe had 44.
Loueckhote, 35, comes from Ouvea
Island in the Loyalty group, and is now
the youngest member of the French
Senate.
The fact that Dick Ukeiwe remained
a candidate reflects the tensions that
exist within the RPCR. Another symp-
tom of this unease was the feud that
developed during the second quarter of
the year between representative
Maurice Nenou, a Melanesian, and
, "
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party president Jacques Lafleur. The
split took place over Maurice Nenou's
decision to run in the March 1993 legis-
lative elections, and over what he per-
ceived to be a lack of consultation in
the running of the party. The two men
had finally made their peace by the end
of May, but these tensions led to the
creation of a new movement within the
RPCR, called M ouvement des Caledo-
niens libres (Movement of Free Caledo-
nians), which gathered some Mela-
nesian elected representatives around
Dick Ukeiwe. The movement, which
called for a more democratic approach
within the anti-independence party,
decided to enter its own candidates in
the March legislative elections. This
decision may well lead to a split in the
RPCR.
The Union oceanienne, representing
some members of resident Wallisian
and Futunan communities, and created
in 1989 to provide a third option in the
territory's bipolar politics, experienced
its own difficulties in 1992. In April, a
splinter group within the party ousted
its president, Michel Hema, who had
held the post since September 1989.
This splinter group called an early con-
vention in July, and appointed a new
managing committee under the chair-
manship of Aloiso Sako, Union ocea-
nienne's former vice-president. How-
ever, both the mainstream and the
splinter groups continue to share a
growing tendency to support the inde-
pendence cause.
The United Kanak Liberation Front
(FULK), a small pro-independence party
led by Yann Celene Uregei and hostile
to the Matignon Accords, decided in
January to disband and announced the
holding of a Convention of the Kanak
People in September. This convention,
which was attended by a number of tra-
ditional high chiefs, decided to reject
elections and political parties in favor of
a return to traditional Melanesian forms
of authority and an immediate move
toward independence. The great sur-
prise of the convention was the nomina-
tion of Charles Attiti, high chief of the
Goro tribe and RPCR militant, as
spokesman for the convention and the
Kanak people. He resigned from the
position the following month, claiming
that he had been misled about the non-
political nature of the convention.
The conflict that had opposed Cono
Hamu, mayor of Lifou (Loyalty
Islands), and two of the island's three
traditional chiefs continued in 1992,
with the setting on fire of some twenty
houses in the village of a clan that the
mayor had supported in a land dispute.
In April, Cono Hamu, his wife, and
children were permanently expelled
from their tribe by the traditional
authorities of the L6ssi tribal district.
In November, the traditional authori-
ties of the Gaicha tribal district also
refused the mayor entry into their dis-
trict, denying him access to his own
town hall. The town hall was taken
over by a Chiefly Coordinating Com-
mittee, which handled essential ser-
vices and demanded the sacking of the
mayor. The high chief of Wet, the third
tribal district of the island, remained
neutral in the conflict, and made possi-
ble the holding of municipal council
meetings in a building located on his
territory. There were disagreements
within the various political parties
regarding the conflict. Although this
particular confrontation seemed to
stem, at least in part, from the person-
"."Ii ,I <
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alities involved, the fundamental ques-
tion of a clear definition of the res-
pective roles of the political and
traditional (chiefly) authorities has yet
to be answered in New Caledonia.
The slowing down of economic
activity, evident over the past two
years, persisted during 1992. The
nickel industry, which produces the
main export commodity, was in crisis
following a sharp drop in world ore
prices. Negotiations between New
Caledonian exporters and Japanese
buyers were suspended in September.
Although the tourism sector has felt the
effects of the global recession, it still
appears to be a potential force for
development in the territory. Two new
tourist resorts opened this year in the
North Province, the Malabou complex
and the Hienghene Club Mediterranee.
The luxury cruise ship Club Med II
began service based in New Caledonia
on 15 December, and it was decided to
begin construction of a new five-star
hotel in Noumea. The North Province,
through an affiliate of its own South
Pacific Mining Company (bought by
the province from Jacques Lafleur in
1990), acquired a majority share in a
holding company that owns two large
hotels in Noumea and the Casino
Royal gambling establishment.
The process of expanding New
Caledonia's relations with the Pacific
region proceeded throughout the year.
A streamlining of customs procedures,
decided early in the year, should facili-
tate the territory's economic participa-
tion in the region. At the same time,
the provinces began to make use of
their new-found authority and started
forging their own regional ties, particu-
larly with Vanuatu and Fiji. In August,
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Secretary-General Ieremia Tabai of the
Forum Secretariat came on an official
visit, the first Forum official to do so.
The South Pacific Commission finally
decided to keep its headquarters in
Noumea, although this had to be
decided by a vote, rather than by con-
sensus as had been the Commission's
tradition in the past.
FRAN90IS SODTER
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
The newly elected government of Paias
Wingti in 1992 embraced a package of
economic and administrative reforms
more radical than any since indepen-
dence in 1975. According to Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister for
Finance Sir Julius Chan, the economic
initiatives were designed to "revolu-
tionize the whole economic structure"
(Callick 1992a, 8). In addition, long-
neglected rural communities were to be
"empowered" by the Village Services
Programme, described by Minister for
Village Services John Nilkare as "the
most fundamental policy shift in our
national history" (TPNG, 13 Aug 1992,
32-33). Furthermore, Wingti promised
to disempower the country's nineteen
provincial governments, whose "whole
dream and purpose [had] gone wrong"
(TPNG, 8 Oct 1992, 32-33). Meanwhile,
the secessionist crisis in Bougainville
spilled over into neighboring Solomon
Islands, severely straining Papua New
Guinea's relations with that country.
Polling for the fourth national par-
liamentary elections since indepen-
dence took place from 13 to 27 June
1992 without any major disruptions.
The new 1000 kina nomination fee
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failed to deter a record 1654 people
from contesting the 109 seats, some 139
more than stood in the 1987 elections
(TPNG, 7 May 1992, 4; Turner and
Hegarty 1987, 4). As a result, 47 mem-
bers of the new parliament won their
first-past-the-post competitions with
less than 20 percent of the vote, and 8
got in with less than 10 percent (TPNG,
16 July 1992, 2). Campaigning was var-
iously described as "oddly subdued"
and "boring," with political parties
playing a lesser role than in previous
elections (Callick 1992b, 20; Kolma
1992, II). Fully one-third of the suc-
cessful candidates listed no party affili-
ation.
In line with a well-established trend,
about 57 percent of sitting members of
parliament, including fifteen cabinet
members, lost their seats. Prominent
among the losers were Deputy Prime
Minister Akoka Doi, Speaker Dennis
Young, Minister for Education Utula
Samana, and Minister for Health Karl
Stack. None of the handful of women
candidates was successful, making this
the second all-male parliament in a
row. Prime Minister Namaliu barely
survived a strong challenge from vet-
eran politician Oscar Tammur to win
his Kokopo seat by fewer than four
hundred votes. Papua New Guinea's
other former prime ministers-Chan,
Wingti, and Sir Michael Somare-all
retained their seats easily. Other suc-
cessful candidates included Paul
Tohian, an ex-police commissioner
who had faced treason charges for a
coup attempt in 1990; prominent aca-
demic John Waiko; and three members
who had resigned from parliament ear-
lier in the year to avoid conviction on
charges of corruption.
Although no single party came close
to commanding a majority in the new
parliament, most observers agreed that
Namaliu had a reasonable chance of
retaining power (TPNG, 2 July 1992 , 3).
Members of the existing coalition of
Pangu Pati, People's Action Party,
League for National Advancement,
and National Party had agreed to stick
together. Namaliu's most powerful
rival within the coalition, People's
Action Party leader and former Deputy
Prime Minister Ted Diro, was out of
the running after his 1991 conviction
for misconduct in office. Foreign Min-
ister Michael Somare had apparently
decided not to pursue a pre-election
leadership challenge that threatened to
split the Pangu lobby.
However, forty-one-year-old Paias
Wingti quickly demonstrated a mastery
of the "numbers game" honed during
his two previous stints as prime minis-
ter (1985-1987,1987-1988). He
received an early boost with the defec-
tion of six former Namaliu supporters,
including the new leader of the League
for National Advancement, John
Nilkare, and three of his colleagues.
Wingti sequestered his supporters on a
remote island in Milne Bay, denying
them virtually all contact with the out-
side world before delivering them to
parliament for the vital vote on 17 July.
This quarantine tactic was facilitated
by a 1991 electoral law reform that
reduced from twenty-one days to seven
the interval between elections and the
first sitting of parliament (Callick
1992C; TPNG, 16 July 1992,1-2).
The new Wingti-Ied coalition of the
People's Democratic Movement, the
People's Progress Party, and the League
for National Advancement, plus a few
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smaller parties and a host of indepen-
dents, managed to elect their candidate
to the office of Speaker by one vote. In
the subsequent vote for prime minister,
Wingti defeated Namaliu 55-54, with
the help of Speaker Bill Skate's casting
vote. However, the numbers on the
government side soon swelled to more
than 60. In a vivid demonstration of
the fluid and pragmatic nature of coali-
tion politics in Papua New Guinea,
defectors explained their need to be
aligned with the government in order
to deliver benefits to their electorates
(TPNG, 23 July 1992, I, 3; 30 July
1992, II).
The composition of the cabinet
announced at the end of July reflected
more pragmatic politics. Members of
Wingti's People's Democratic Move-
ment received 10 of the 27 available
portfolios, including the all-important
mining and petroleum position. Chan's
People's Progress Party, which claimed
the support of seventeen members of
parliament by the end of the year,
received only 5. But they included the
powerful Ministry of Finance, and the
difficult Defence portfolio, which went
to controversial ex-Police Commis-
sioner Paul Tohian. Another 9 posi-
tions went to independents, with the
experienced John Kaputin becoming
minister for foreign affairs, and former
Chimbu provincial premier David Mai
taking on the newly important Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry. Of the
four League of National Advancement
defectors, 3 were rewarded with cabi-
net positions, most notably John
Nilkare who became the new minister
for provincial affairs and village devel-
opment. Meanwhile, Michael Somare
became leader of the opposition after
the defeated Rabbie Namaliu, whose
wife was seriously ill, resigned from
parliament (TPNG, 30 July 1992, 2,4;
PR, 20 Aug 1992, 2).
In his first six months in office,
Wingti fulfilled several specific election
promises. He abolished primary school
fees and began to phase out charges for
secondary education. He scrapped the
ambitious National Service Corps
scheme, brainchild of defeated member
for West Sepik Province, Karl Stack.
Less likely to produce lasting results
were his moves to counter corruption
in high places.
Wingti had no difficulty making
corruption a central election issue
(Hiambohn 1992, 11-12). He has a long
record of exposing corrupt practices,
and launched the forestry industry
inquiry that led to the downfall of Ted
Diro in 1991. Diro was one of nine
leaders charged in recent years with
violating the constitution's leadership
code, and these cases probably repre-
sent only the tip of the iceberg. In 1990,
Chief Ombudsman Charles Maino
indicated that his office was investigat-
ing 90 of the 109 members of parlia-
ment for abuses related to the Elector-
ate Development Fund. This "slush
fund" allowed each member to spend
100,000 kina annually on discretionary
projects in his electorate (peA 1991,3°).
The corruption cases heard in the
first part of 1992 gave Wingti plenty of
ammunition for his attacks on the gov-
ernment. In February, former Minister
for Fisheries Allan Ebu was found
guilty of nine offenses under the leader-
ship code (TPNG, 13 Feb 1992, 2). Then
on 27 March a leadership tribunal not
only found Labour and Employment
Minister Tony Ila guilty of forty-three
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counts of misconduct in office, but
implicated Prime Minister Namaliu
and Finance Minister Paul Pora in the
wrongdoing. Among other things, the
tribunal found that payments of
49,000 kina to Ila in 1989, from a dis-
cretionary fund controlled by Namaliu
and Pora, were made in response to
Ila's threats to support a parliamentary
motion of no confidence. The tribunal
strongly recommended that Namaliu
and Pora "be investigated and brought
to justice" (Hogan 1992, 12-13; PR, 26
March 1992, 6).
The two leaders were implicated
again in a later case involving four of
their Pangu Pati colleagues. In June
1990 Timothy Bonga, Galeng Lang,
Melchior Pep, and Peter Garong had
agreed to resign their ministerial port-
folios so that Namaliu could use the
positions to bolster his flagging sup-
port among backbenchers. According
to the Ombudsman Commission,
which recommended that the four be
charged with a total of sixty-four
counts of misconduct, the ex-ministers
subsequently demanded, and received,
various sums of money from Namaliu
and Pora-as compensation for loss of
office and to keep them loyal in an
upcoming vote of no confidence. In the
event, the Ombudsman Commission's
recommendations could not be acted
on immediately. Following precedents
established by Tony Ila and Tom
Amaiu, another member of parliament
who faced thirty-five counts of miscon-
duct in 1992, the four leaders resigned
from parliament to avoid penalty
(TPNG, 7 May 1992, 1,3).
At the end ofJuly, the Supreme
Court confirmed that a leadership tri-
bunal ceased to have jurisdiction when
a leader resigned. However, the court
also noted that if a leader were to
regain public office, previous charges
of misconduct could be pursued (TPNG,
6 Aug 1992, 3). Bonga was unsuccessful
in his reelection bid, and Lang died in
August, but charges against Pep and
Garong were duly revived after they
were returned to parliament (TPNG, 22
Oct 1992, 4, IS). Furthermore, fourteen
charges of misappropriation of public
funds were pending against Namaliu
and Porain the Boroko District Court
at the end of the year (TPNG, 17 Dec
1992, II).
In the first half of 1992, members of
the opposition were also able to target
several government projects involving
dubious foreign transactions. One was
the attempt spearheaded by Foreign
Minister Somare to establish a state-
owned oil and gas company with the
help of Quest Petroleum, an obscure
Singapore-based company (TPNG, 13
Feb 1992, II; 27 Feb 1992, 20-21).
Another was the Port Moresby-Pore-
porena freeway project to be con-
structed by two Australian companies
at a cost of 65 million kina. Critics
charged that the freeway was an unnec-
essary luxury, the relevant government
departments had been bypassed, the
cost was excessive, and some officials
stood to benefit personally (TPNG, 28
May 1992, 3; 3 Sept 1992, I).
Once in office, Prime Minister
Wingti abolished the controversial
electorate "slush fund," established a
commission to investigate the Pore-
porena freeway deal, and promised to
close "absurd" loopholes in the leader-
ship code (TPNG, 3 Sept 1992, I; PR, 20
Aug 1992,2). Nevertheless, it will be
difficult for Wingti to keep his govern-
POLITICAL REVIEWS
ment free of corrupt practices.
Although Wingti himself may be above
reproach, some of his cabinet col-
leagues, including Roy Yaki, Paul
Tohian, and John Jaminan, have had
serious encounters with the law (TPNG,
30 July 1992, 2; Callick 1992C, 35). Fur-
thermore, entrenched systems of
patronage and pork-barrel politics will
be difficult to dislodge. Critics quickly
discovered some new sources of discre-
tionary funds for members in the 1993
budget (TPNG, 19 Nov 1992, 71). The
real test of Wingti's resolve will come
in early 1994, when the opposition will
have its first opportunity to mount a
parliamentary vote of no confidence,
and the "numbers game" begins again.
Wingti adopted a much more
aggressive posture than did his prede-
cessor in the booming mining and oil
sector. His ambitious longer-term
plans for capturing more of Papua
New Guinea's natural resource wealth
include an oil refinery, a copper
smelter, a gold refinery, and a major
liquefied natural gas industry. During
his first six months in office he concen-
trated on reviewing "unequal or
exploitative" resource agreements with
foreign companies (TPNG, 22 Oct
1992,9).
The principal target was Placer
Pacific, the operator of the giant
Porgera gold mine. Wingti accused the
company of misleading the government
regarding the value of the resource
when the mining agreement was signed
in 1989. His claim appeared credible,
not least because his principal adviser
on mining issues, Robert Needham,
had earlier been managing director of
Placer Pacific and heavily involved in
the development of Porgera. Neverthe-
less, Placer and its corporate partners,
Renison Goldfields Consolidated, and
Highland's Gold, continued to refuse
the government's demand to increase
its equity share in the joint-venture
company from 10 to 30 percent. In
November the conflict intensified when
the government abruptly ordered that
all flights between mining projects and
Australian ports must go via Port
Moresby, a move that Placer claimed
would significantly increase its operat-
ing costs at Porgera (TPNG, 5 Nov
1992,9).
Conzinc Riotinto of Australia was
the other foreign mining company sin-
gled out for attention during the year.
In September 1990, it established the
Mount Kare Alluvial Mining joint ven-
ture to mine gold at a remote site in
Enga Province. Through the Kare-
Puga Development Corporation, land-
owners were given a 49 percent share in
the venture, an arrangement hailed by
Conzinc Riotinto as a model of com-
pany-landowner collaboration. Some
landowner groups disagreed, claiming
that Kare-Puga Development Corpora-
tion did not represent their interests. In
January 1992 the depth of local dissat-
isfaction was dramatically demon-
strated when fifteen armed men raided
the mine site, causing some three mil-
lion dollars worth of damage, and clos-
ing the mine for the rest of the year
(TPNG, 23 Jan 1992, 4).
A key complicating factor in the
Mount Kare situation was the involve-
ment of two small West Australian
mining companies. Ramsgate Re-
sources had earlier offered to replace
Conzinc Riotinto as mine operator and
give landowners a better deal. Com-
pany officials denied any complicity in
0'
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the January raid, but made no secret of
their financial support, in partnership
with Menzies Gold, for legal challenges
to Conzinc Riotinto's mining rights.
The national principals of Amadio, the
local company pursuing the litigation,
claimed that Conzinc Riotinto had
duped local leaders into signing an
unfavorable agreement, and that pro-
cedural irregularities rendered the min-
ing lease invalid (Sharma 1992, 14; PR,
28 May 1992, 5; 16 Nov 1992, 5; Callick
1993). The latter charge was dismissed
by the National Court in November
(TPNG, 26 Nov 1992, 3).
Neither Prime Minister Wingti nor
Mining and Petroleum Minister
Masket Iangalio, an Engan, appeared
to have any sympathy for Conzinc
Riotinto's Mount Kare predicament.
Both had publicly attacked the com-
pany in the aftermath of the January
raid (TPNG, 23 Jan 1992, 4). As mining
minister, Iangalio indicated in Novem-
ber that the company would be free to
proceed if it defeated the court chal-
lenge, but just a few days later he
stated that Ramsgate and Menzies
Gold had the complete support of
Mount Kare landowners (IBP, Dec
1992,14). Critics were also quick to
point out that one of Wingti's key
advisers, Dennis Reinhardt, had busi-
ness connections with Ramsgate,
although Wingti denied that these ties
had any significance.
Government-ConziQc Riotinto rela-
tions suffered a further setback late in
the year when Wingti declared that the
company's Bougainville copper mine,
closed by militant landowners in 1989,
would reopen in 1993, but not neces-
sarily under company control. Officials
of Conzinc Riotinto (and most other
commentators) dismissed the idea of an
early reopening as unrealistic, and
described the cost estimate of Robert
Needham (managing director of the
Mineral Resources Development Cor-
poration) that it could be done for less
than 100 million kina as "wildly opti-
mistic" (PR, 14 Dec 1992, 5). Bruised by
developments in recent years, Conzinc
Riotinto of Australia took steps during
1992 to prune its investments in Papua
New Guinea, selling its shares in the
Hidden Valley and Frieda River pros-
pects, and transferring management of
the Mount Kare mine to Placer Pacific
(TPNG, 12 Nov 1992, 23; PR, 16 Nov
1992,5).
Wingti's offensives against Conzinc
Riotinto and Placer Pacific dented
investor confidence enough to demon-
strate the potential pitfalls of this
approach. His promise to review
resource agreements caused an imme-
diate drop in the share values of mining
companies with interests in Papua New
Guinea. Moreover, the new mood
made it more difficult for Kennecott to
raise the capital for its Lihir gold pro-
ject and delayed the government's own
plans to refinance its 22.5 percent stake
in the Kutubu oil project, which went
into production in June (TPNG, 17 Dec
1992,4). However, this is unlikely to be
more than a temporary setback. Min-
ing Minister Iangalio made it clear that
what his government objected to was
"being pushed or even bullied by Aus-
tralians," and that it was "strongly
committed to business" (PR, 16 Nov
1992,4). Some other government ini-
tiatives lent strong support to this
claim.
The new government faced the




nomic policies that would translate the
proceeds of a transient resources boom
into permanently improved living stan-
dards for most Papua New Guineans.
The challenge is predicated not only on
concern for the welfare of the masses,
whose living standards have been
declining in recent years. Many com-
mentators also believe that the notori-
ous law-and-order problem represents
the first symptoms of the widespread
social and political unrest that could
develop should real improvements fail
to eventuate. The real fear is that, if
present trends continue, foreign inves-
tors will be deterred and the resources
boom itself will be in jeopardy.
The general economic approach
adopted by the Wingti government
owed much to the World Bank's ideas
about "structural adjustment" to global
market forces. The Namaliu govern-
ment had already taken the first tenta-
tive steps along this road, particularly
by establishing the Investment Promo-
tion Authority to deregulate the private
sector and stimulate its growth (TPNG,
II June 1992, 26). However, in 1992
Wingti and Finance Minister Chan
propelled the process of structural
adjustment into high gear with a radi-
cal program of privatization and fiscal
reform.
The first piece of legislation pushed
through parliament in August created
the Papua New Guinea Holdings Com-
pany as a vehicle to privatize state-
owned enterprises. The company has
virtually unlimited powers to decide
which state enterprises will be sold, to
identify buyers, and to raise and trans-
fer funds. Board members are not sub-
ject to the leadership code and appear
to be accountable only to the prime
minister (Callick 1992C, 36). No
privatization agenda had been
announced by the end of the year, but
Chan indicated that some of the state's
equity in major resource projects
would be made available to the public.
Plans were also under way to establish
a stock exchange to encourage "pro-
ductive investment" and prevent
domestic funds being "squandered or
... transferred abroad" (Callick
1992C, 37; PR, 3 Sept 1992,1).
According to Chan, the new govern-
ment was determined to sweep away
"mosquito taxes" and make Papua
New Guinea a "pest free" zone for busi-
ness activity. Namaliu had already
revived a scheme that gave pioneer
industries a five-year tax holiday and
other concessions. The 1993 budget
exempted a range of fringe benefits
from taxation and significantly
reduced personal and corporate tax
rates, making them among the lowest
in the Asia-Pacific region. In another
significant development, this one initi-
ated by the independent 1992-93 Mini-
mum Wages Board and warmly wel-
comed by the government, the starting
urban minimum wage was slashed
from 61.60 kina per week to 22.96 kina
per week, bringing it into line with the
rural rate.
Wingti even proposed to venture
into the tricky area of land reform, tell-
ing parliament that "the lack of clear
title and delineation of land has
imposed insurmountable constraints
on all forms of development. My Gov-
ernment commits itself to mobilize
land" (PR, 20 Aug 1992,1). Since more
than 97 percent of land remains under
traditional tenure, this is potentially
the most radical reform of all. How-
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ever, by year's end there was no indica-
tion of how and when it might be
implemented.
It is too early to tell what results
these extraordinary reforms will yield.
It is not clear, for example, how many
Papua New Guinean entrepreneurs and
business people are in a position to
benefit from the new investment cli-
mate. The vast majority of the popula-
tion continues to depend primarily on
subsistence production, and the pool of
domestic savings to be mobilized is
small. Previous share issues to nation-
als in potentially lucrative resource
projects have been undersubscribed
(Callick 1992C, 37). It seems inevitable
that foreign enterprise will benefit the
most and that the distribution of
income and assets among nationals will
become even more skewed in favor of a
privileged few (TPNG, 13 Aug 1992, 1).
Even in terms of job creation, osten-
sibly the major purpose of the reform
program, the prognosis is not encour-
aging. According to Minister for Trade
and Industry David Mai, the goal is to
increase the number of industrial and
manufacturing jobs from the present
28,000 to at least 80,000 by the year
2000 (TPNG, 26 Nov 1992, 32-34). If
this goal is met, it will only absorb a
small fraction of the 50,000 or so
young people who enter the work force
every year. Furthermore, although the
purpose of reducing the urban mini-
mum wage is to create more employ-
ment opportunities, a wage of 22.96
kina per week is clearly insufficient by
itself to support a single person, let
alone a family, in an urban area (TPNG,
8 Oct 1992, 34).
By guaranteeing price support for
Papua New Guinea's flagging export
crops for five years, the Wingti govern-
ment demonstrated that it was not pre-
pared to buy the complete World Bank
structural adjustment package. Wingti
noted that the agricultural sector "is
the backbone of the economy from
which most of our population gain
their livelihood" and hoped that the
boost in smallholder incomes would
encourage people to see "that there is a
sound future in agriculture production
and in the villages" (TPNG, 29 Oct
1992,30 ).
The Village Services Programme
represented another major attempt of
the Wingti government to make rural
life more attractive. Its stated purpose
was to encourage grassroots participa-
tion in the process of development
through the provision of resources,
training, and information. It would
work through the 240 or so existing
community or village governments,
and have an annual budget of about
half a million kina per community
when fully operational (TPNG, 13 Aug
1992,32-33).
The idea of the central government
directly targeting village communities
is not new. Many of the existing com-
munity governments had their origins
in the colonial system of local govern-
ment councils, whose official aims
included coordinating resources at the
local level and preparing people to gov-
ern themselves. In practice, however,
most local government councils failed
to empower local communities, serving
instead as agents of the central admin-
istration (Conyers 1976, 7). The Wingti
government scheme was still being
developed at year's end, with pilot pro-
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grams planned for 1993, and it remains
to be seen whether it can stimulate gen-
uine bottom-up decision-making and
local control.
Although few were prepared to pub-
licly criticize Wingti's idea of commu-
nity empowerment, his October state-
ment that "we cannot continue" with
the existing quasi-federal system of
provincial government set off a fire-
storm of protest. In a speech to the Port
Moresby Chamber of Commerce he
attacked the system as wasteful and
inefficient and noted that nearly half of
the nineteen provincial governments
had been suspended for gross misman-
agement and corruption at one time or
another (TPNG, 8 Oct 1992, 32).
Indeed, four more were suspended by
cabinet a few weeks after Wingti's
speech (TPNG, 15 Oct 1992, I).
The government initially considered
implementing the recommendations of
the 1990 Select Committee on Provin-
cial Government Review, chaired by
the late Henu Hesingut (TPNG, 22 Oct
1992, I). In essence, this would strip
provincial governments of most of
their powers and privileges, replacing
them with part-time assemblies consist-
ing of uncompensated representatives
of community governments. Each
assembly would elect one full-time, sal-
aried chairperson. Provincial govern-
ments could still make laws and raise
and allocate funds, but under tight cen-
tral government control (TPNG, 15 Oct
1992,4). However, by November it
was quite clear that the political cost of
pushing through such reforms was
going to be high. With the premiers of
the powerful island provinces threaten-
ing to secede, Wingti bowed to the
inevitable and formed a bipartisan
committee to investigate the matter
further (TPNG, 21 Jan 1993, 4).
Prime Minister Wingti came to
power with no stated policy for solving
the secessionist crisis in Bougainville,
although Minister for Foreign Affairs
John Kaputin indicated in July that the
new government would adopt a "politi-
cal approach" (TPNG, 23 July 1992, 3).
However, by November, with Defence
Force troops camped at Tunuru, a few
miles from the provincial capital and
rebel stronghold of Arawa, Wingti was
calling on leaders of the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army (BRA) to surren-
der unconditionally. He promised to
resolve the crisis by the end of 1993,
using all of the military forces at his
disposal if necessary (TPNG, 26 Nov
1992,3; Keith-Reid 1992, 26).
Earlier in the year, attention was
focused on the southern part of the
island, where leaders had signed an
agreement with the Port Moresby gov-
ernment to set up the South Bougain-
ville Interim Authority. In May, troops
landed at Siwai to consolidate this
advance, and also at Torokina about
half-way down the west coast (SMH, 21
May 1992). This left only central
Bougainville entirely under BRA con-
trol. Nevertheless, periodic clashes
between the army and rebel forces
occurred throughout the island during
the year, as well as reports of fighting
between local pro- and anti-BRA fac-
tions. In March, the Bougainville Rev-
olutionary Army captured nine leaders
associated with the new interim
authority in south Bougainville. For-
mer Member of Parliament Anthony
Anugu and two others were executed
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at BRA headquarters in the mining
town of Panguna. The others managed
to escape after nearly two months in
captivity (TPNG, 20 Aug 1992, 15; 27
Aug 1992,18).
Wingti may have regretted endors-
ing the military option in Bougainville
when the "spillover" effects of the con-
flict caused a major crisis in Papua
New Guinea's relations with Solomon
Islands late in the year. Tensions had
been rising for some time as Papua
New Guinea attempted to get Solomon
Islands to take firmer action against
BRA members and supporters operating
in the Solomons. Then in March,
Papua New Guinea Defence Force
troops crossed the border and blew up
a suspected BRA fuel depot near Kariki
village on Fauro Island in the Shortland
group (PR, 26 Mar 1992, I). Respond-
ing to Solomon Islands' subsequent
protest, then Prime Minister Namaliu
indi<;ated that the raid was unauthor-
ized and offered compensation. How-
ever, Solomon Islands Prime Minister
Solomon Mamaloni refused to talk
with Namaliu, cancelled a planned
visit by Foreign Minister Somare, and
declined to attend a scheduled meeting
of the Melanesian Spearhead Group in
Papua New Guinea (PR, 23 April
1992, I).
At Mamaloni's insistence, no further
high level discussions between the two
countries were held until shortly after
Wingti assumed power, when the two
prime ministers met at the rescheduled
Melanesian Spearhead Group meeting
in Vanuatu. In September, just as rela-
tions began to improve, soldiers of the
Papua New Guinea Defence Force
mounted another unauthorized cross-
border raid. During the foray into
Komaliae village in the Shortland
Islands, the troops killed a man and his
sister, wounded her child, and took
another Solomon Islands citizen to
Buka for questioning (Waqa 1992).
Mamaloni issued a strongly worded
protest note about the "barbaric" inci-
dent, and threatened to sever diplo-
matic ties with Papua New Guinea.
Although Wingti acted swiftly to repair
the damage, agreeing to discipline the
troops involved and accepting allliabil-
ity, Mamaloni continued to press for a
United Nations Security Council inves-
tigation (PR, I Oct 1992, I).
In late November it was Wingti's
turn to protest about a letter Mamaloni
wrote to Manus Premier Stephen
Pokawin. In it he discussed the Port
Moresby government's handling of the
Bougainville situation in derogatory
terms, and agreed to host a meeting of
provincial premiers disgruntled with
Wingti's plans to rescind their powers
(IBP, Dec 1992, II).
At year's end, officials were discus-
sing a comprehensive agreement that
would guide future relations between
the two countries (TPNG 21 Jan 1993,
2). Papua New Guinea has a similar
agreement with Indonesia, which was
also negotiated in the context of spill-
over problems associated with a seces-
sionist struggle. Indeed, those prob-
lems continued in 1992, with an influx
of five hundred refugees from Irian
Jaya in January and a mid-year border
incursion by Indonesian troops in pur-
suit of guerrilla fighters from Organi-
sasi Papua Merdeka (TPNG, 30 Jan
1992,8; 4 June 1992, 5). Nevertheless,
relations between these two neighbors
have improved considerably in recent
years. In January 1992, a Status of
l,,1
POLITICAL REVIEWS
Forces Agreement was signed that will
allow Indonesian and Papua New
Guinean soldiers to cooperate on pub-
lic works projects in Papua New
Guinea (TPNG, 6 Feb 1992, 3).
TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni of
Solomon Islands was voted one of the
six personalities of the year by Islands
Business Pacific, a regional monthly
magazine. He had always kept a few
steps ahead of his political rivals,
despite growing concern about the
unstable financial affairs of his govern-
ment and the deterioration of relations
with Papua New Guinea over the
Bougainville crisis (IBP, Dec 1992). Not
only was the prime minister's ability
recognized, but these two issues domi-
nated the politics, economic, and inter-
national relations of Solomon Islands
during the year.
Minister of Finance Christopher
Columbus Abe, in his 1992 budget
speech, reiterated the government's
commitment to reducing deficit spend-
ing, diversifying activities in the private
sector, and improving the country's
balance of payments performance (SN,
· ,
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Mar 1992). The governor general's
speech recognized the same problems.
In his new year address, "Consolida-
tion for Peace and Unity," the head of
state recognized that the resources
needed to produce the much-needed
revenue to relieve the current situation
continue to be untapped, not fully real-
ized, or even not realized at all (5N, Jan
1992). This is the dilemma that contin-
ues to plague governments, present and
past: how to create wealth from availa-
ble resources to pay for the services
provided.
With the passing of the budget at
SI$255.9 million, the new government
of national unity under Solomon
Mamaloni was given a mandate to con-
tinue until the current parliament ends
in mid-1993, despite the earlier rejec-
tion by parliament of the 1992 Goods
Tax and Pay Roll Tax bills, which
together were expected to raise a total
revenue of SI$33.8 million. The Goods
Tax Bill was later reintroduced and
was passed by the national parliament
in the later part of the year.
A major component of the recurrent
budget continued to be consumed by
government expenditures on salaries
and wages for its employees. Stream-
lining of the public service continued,
with two hundred workers laid off,
most of whom were of retirement age
(55, Sept 1992). The development
budget received an increased commit-
ment, and as usual grant aid financed a
significant proportion of these pro-
grams and projects.
The 1991 report of the Central Bank
of Solomon Islands warned the govern-
ment about its huge deficit spending.
Repeating the same concern for the
past several years, the bank noted that
the government had doubled its domes-
tic borrowing. At the beginning of the
year the domestic debt of the central
government reached SI$172 million, at
a cost of SI$20 million per year in inter-
est payments to domestic lenders (CBSI
1991). The caution was well taken by
the government, and during the year
restraint was placed on borrowing
from the domestic banking system
(PIM, Feb 1993).
The external performance of the
Solomon Islands economy was favor-
able because prices for copra, palm oil,
and logs were above their 1991 price
level for a good part of the year. How-
ever, the country's terms of trade had
declined considerably, and Solomon
Islands had to produce and export
more to maintain the same level of
imports (PIM, Feb 1993). Under the
Lome convention, the European Eco-
nomic Community has given sl$16 mil-
lion to Solomon Islands under the Sta-
bilization of Export Earnings Fund, to
compensate for losses in copra and
cocoa export earnings. Such arrange-
ments continue to support the econ-
omy (55, May 1992).
The government continued its
privatization program and, amid wide-
spread public criticism, agreed to sell
70 percent of its share in the nationally
owned Solomon Airlines. Toward the
end of the year only one bid had been
received when tenders closed. During
the year the airline took delivery of a
new Boeing 737-300 aircraft. The
National Provident Fund, a govern-
ment statutory establishment, bought
the government's 49 percent share in
the National Bank of Solomon Islands,
which is the largest and oldest of the
three commercial banks registered in
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the country. The remaining 51 percent
of the shares are still held by the Com-
monwealth Bank of Australia. The
government also sold to the landown-
ers its shares in Kolombangara Forest
Products, a joint venture of the Solo-
mon Islands government and the Com-
monwealth Development Corporation
(55, Nov 1992). The government sold a
prime site to an overseas group of busi-
nesses for hotel development; the site
includes Government House and some
government office buildings. The sale
caused a lot of controversy and raised
many questions from the public about
the integrity of the deal (55, May 1992).
The year 1992 was important for the
tourist industry. The government
declared it "Visit Solomon Islands
Tourism Year," a declaration timed to
coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of
the beginning of World War II in Solo-
mon Islands and the Heads of Govern-
ment Forum meeting. The aims of Visit
Solomon Islands Year were: to educate
and increase public awareness of the
tourism industry; to increase publicity
to the outside world about Solomon
Islands' diverse cultures and peoples;
and to encourage the participation of
Solomon Islanders in the celebrations,
thereby creating and enhancing nation-
al pride (5N, Mar 1992).
The ministers of the Peoples Alli-
ance Party resigned from the party fol-
lowing a political split in which a gov-
ernment of national unity was formed.
Solomon Mamaloni, who had resigned
earlier from the Peoples Alliance Party,
continued as head of the government.
His support grew when Charles Dausa-
bea, MP for East Honiara, was
appointed minister of Home Affairs.
The Honorable Charles Dausabea was
an independent member who showed
strong support for the Mamaloni gov-
ernment. His appointment was necessi-
tated by the resignation of Sir Peter
Kenilorea, the first prime minister of
Solomon Islands. A move to dissolve
the current parliament early in Decem-
ber did not materialize for lack of sup-
port.
Rennell and Bellona began talks
about creating their own provincial
government after making a successful
request to the government. The estab-
lishment of this new province will
bring the number of provinces to nine,
excluding Honiara, the capital city.
The national parliament approved
nine new boundaries, bringing the total
number of constituencies from 38 to
47. Makira, Isabel, and Choiseul prov-
inces each have one additional constit-
uency, and Malaita, Western, and
Guadalcanal provinces each have two.
According to the report of the Constit-
uency Boundary Commission, the new
constituencies were determined on the
basis of such factors as population,
communication, and ethnic affiliation
(55, Dec 1992).
Early in the year Prime Minister
Solomon Mamaloni again reshuffled
his cabinet, a move that involved some
of his senior ministers, including Sir
Baddeley Devesi, who went from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Health
and Medical Services, and the Honor-
able Dudley Tausinga, from the Minis-
try of Natural Resources to Foreign
Affairs (5N Apr 1992). This reorganiza-
tion also affected the permanent secre-
taries, resulting in a reshuffling of
almost half of the fifteen contracted
officers. No specific reason was given
for these movements, but they can be
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construed as a political maneuver by
the prime minister to keep his ministers
and permanent secretaries in line.
Described as startling, the compre-
hensive report on the ten-month survey
of literacy was presented to the Minis-
ter of Education and Human Resour-
ces Development. The report found
that the illiteracy rate in Solomon
Islands was quite high, with 38 percent
of the people unable to read or write.
Alarmed, the minister declared illiter-
acy a real problem that must be
addressed. The report stresses the
importance of literacy at the individ-
ual, family, and national levels. Indi-
viduals can increase their knowledge
without attending formal educational
institutions by reading books and other
printed matter. A family with a literate
mother will have healthier children.
The nation will benefit from a healthier
population and will therefore increase
its productivity. Well documented in
the report are recommendations that
will help improve literacy (55, May
1992).
Authorities should take these rec-
ommendations seriously. Ironically,
the Minister of Finance in his earlier
budget speech emphasized the need to
enhance workers' skills by providing
funds for primary education improve-
ment, secondary education expansion,
and provision of overseas scholarships
(5N, Mar 1992).
The Government committed more
than 51$13 million to improvement of
health services to the people. Of this,
over $9 million was earmarked for the
Rural Health Service Program, under
which new rural clinics will be built
and older ones replaced (5N, Mar
1992).
The central hospital and other
health centers throughout the country
ran out of medical supplies when a
shipment was delayed because the gov-
ernment owed the suppliers more than
51$1.3 million (55, May 1992). Therea-
sons the government was not able to
honor its bill earlier may include the
growth of the population in relation to
the government's ability to provide
social services. Solomon Islands has
one of the highest population growth
rates in the world, and if the govern-
ment is to maintain a reasonable level
of medical and other social services,
based on its ability to pay for them,
concerted efforts must be made to slow
the rate of population growth.
The quality and level of medical ser-
vices declined considerably when
twenty-six national doctors, who were
members of the Solomon Islands Medi-
cal Association, resigned from the
Solomon Islands Public Service in a dis-
pute over increasing allowances for
doctors. The mass resignation resulted
from the doctors' dissatisfaction with
the government's slow response to their
demand for better conditions of service
(5N, July 1992). The remaining doctors
worked under difficult conditions;
occasionally the Ministry of Health
and Medical Services solicited the ser-
vices of private doctors.
The second world war came to Solo-
mon Islands in March 1942, when Jap-
anese forces started moving into the
islands. American and Allied forces
landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August
1942 to begin a campaign, codenamed
Operation Watch Tower, to halt the
Japanese advance toward Australia
and New Zealand (55, Aug 1992). The
war in Solomon Islands was bitter, and
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the campaign was among the most dif-
ficult and fiercely fought in the Pacific
theater. The Japanese forces were
defeated at the Battle of Guadalcanal in
early 1943, and by the end of 1944 the
war had moved out of Solomon
Islands. With the end of the war a new
period of history dawned, sharply dif-
ferentiated from the period before the
war. As one Solomon Island academi-
cian stated, the modern Solomon
Islands was born on 7 August 1942 (5V,
Aug 1992).
The fiftieth anniversary of the US
and Allied landing was celebrated in
Honiara for three days. American and
Allied veterans and Solomon Islanders
who were involved in the campaign
fifty years ago remembered their fallen
comrades (IBP, Oct 1992).
The spillover effects of the Bougain-
ville crisis have severely strained rela-
tions between Solomon Islands and
Papua New Guinea, with numerous
discussions held since the crisis began.
The Memorandum of Understanding
signed by the two countries in 1990
covered border surveillance. Because of
constraints on the availability of per-
sonnel as well as costs, Solomon
Islands had only a limited ability to
maintain continuous and effective sur-
veillance over an extensive boundary
for an indefinite period. Since the crisis
began, the government has recorded at
least twenty-two incursions and illegal
crossings by PNG soldiers and the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army prior
to September 1992. In that month,
members of the PNG Defence Force
raided Komaliae village in the
Shortland Islands, killing two Solomon
Islanders (PlM, Nov 1993). The Solo-
mon Islands government reacted
strongly to the brutal killing of its citi-
zens and sent a strong note of protest
to the government of Papua New
Guinea (5N, Sept 1992). Prime Minister
Mamaloni also questioned the Austra-
lian government's role in the crisis.
The change of political leadership in
Papua New Guinea was welcomed by
Mamaloni, who placed high hopes in
the new government's ability to find a
lasting solution to the crisis (55, July
1992). With enthusiasm, both leaders
signed the Vila Accord during an
extraordinary meeting of the Melane-
sian Spearhead Group in Port Vila,
Vanuatu. The signing revived the dia-
logue and the process of "work[ing]
together and in accordance with
Melanesian traditions and shared inter-
ests to speedily and amicably address
the spillover effects of the crisis" (PlM,
Nov 1992).
The presence of a Bougainville
secessionist office and representative in
Honiara continued to embarrass the
Solomon Islands government. Present-
ing their report in the national parlia-
ment, the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee chaired by Francis Saemala, MP,
recommended that the office be closed
and replaced with a reputable nongov-
ernment organization to set up and
operate a center for coordinating
humanitarian assistance to the people
of Bougainville. The report reaffirmed
the government's position that it recog-
nizes Bougainville as an integral part of
Papua New Guinea (5N, Sept 1992).
The debate on the report in Solomon
Islands indicates a split in the govern-
ment on how to handle the spillover
effects of the crisis (55, Sept 1992). Two
cabinet ministers are from constituen-
cies that are most affected by the crisis,
, .
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and their people have blood relatives in
Bougainville. The dialogue between
government officials of both countries
was expected to resume in early 1993.
MIKE WATE
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VANUATU
Defying rumors of imminent collapse,
the coalition government assembled
after the December 1991 elections held
together throughout 1992. This gov-
ernment, which embodied a pragmatic
alliance between the mainly franco-
phone-based Union of Moderate Par-
ties and the mainly anglophone and
Anglican-based National United Party,
grappled with Vanuatu's economic
management and development prob-
lems. It recast the country's external
relations, restoring relations with
France while maintaining mostly con-
structive links with other powers,
despite squabbles with Australia.
The new government moved quickly
to replace about thirty senior officials
regarded as too closely associated with
the previous administration. The
replacements sparked claims, denied
by the prime minister, that his govern-
ment was favoring French-educated ni-
Vanuatu over their English-educated
counterparts (see vw, II Jan 1992, 7; PR
2 April 1992, 3-4; 16 April 1992, 6).
The large majority of public servants
retained their positions subject to con-
tinued loyal service.
In late January, Foreign Minister
Serge Vohor led a delegation to New
Caledonia, in the first overseas visit
made on behalf of the new govern-
ment. The delegation discussed eco-
nomic cooperation and cultural
exchange, and confirmed acceptance
of an offer of educational aid. Earlier
in the month New Caledonia had
responded promptly with relief aid
following the impact on Vanuatu of
Cyclone Betsy. During the visit New
Caledonian conservative leader
Jacques Lafleur rebuffed claims that
New Caledonia wished to interfere in
Vanuatu's internal affairs and con-
firmed French recognition of Vanuatu
as a sovereign and independent state
(vw, 25 Jan 1992, 12). Later in the year
Vanuatu foreshadowed the opening of
a consulate in Noumea.
Prime Minister Maxime Carlot had
the custom name of Korman bestowed
by the people of his home village of
Erakor on Efate in mid-February, and
became known as Maxime Carlot Kor-
man. Prime Minister Korman made
official visits to Australia in March, to
New Zealand in April, and to France in
May. In Australia and New Zealand he
confirmed that his government,
although keen to establish good rela-
tions with France and end long-stand-
ing conflicts and bitterness, also
wished to maintain constructive rela-
tions with Australia and New Zealand.
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But Australia-Vanuatu relations
worsened in July, when the Vanuatu
government expelled James Pearson,
an Australian diplomat. It claimed that
he had interfered improperly in
Vanuatu's internal affairs by speaking
strongly at a Union of Moderate Par-
ties meeting, at which he was present
as an observer, about the negative
implications for business confidence of
proposed new legislation giving the
government summary powers to
revoke commercial licenses.
The diplomat may have been out-
spoken, even abrasive. Yet the Austra-
lian government believed that the
expulsion order was an overreaction.
Some observers thought the expulsion
was partly motivated by the Union of
Moderate Parties' animosity toward
Australia dating back to Australian
diplomatic support for the "Anglo-
phone" nationalist movement in the
lead-up to independence in 1980. The
Australian government responded by
cancelling official ship visits to
Vanuatu. Routine port calls continued,
however, as did the provision of Aus-
tralian aid, and prospects seemed rea-
sonable for the return of relations to
normal after some months.
Bilateral tensions resurfaced in
October, if briefly, over the election of
former Vanuatu President George Ati
Sokomanu as secretary-general of the
South Pacific Commission. Australia
held strong reservations about his
appointment. It thought that despite
his merits and experience he lacked the
modern management skills and exper-
tise required to update and reform the
commission's administration. Doubts
also existed about his judgment, given
his involvement in the abortive consti-
tutional coup in Vanuatu in December
1988, during which he had attempted
to install his custom nephew Barak
Sope as prime minister (see Hen-
ningham, 1989, 188; Connell, 1989,
164-165). The selection process was
also contentious: after the surprise
withdrawal of the strongly favored
alternative candidate, Sokomanu was
left as the only horse in the race. One
Islander delegate quipped that the pro-
cess reminded him of procedures for
the election of the president in the for-
mer Soviet Union.
Some Vanuatu leaders reportedly
believed that Australia's opposition to
Sokomanu's candidature was "pay-
back" for the expulsion of the Austra-
lian diplomat in July. For his part, the
newly appointed secretary-general
publicly accused Australia in particu-
lar, as well as other donor countries, of
having a "colonial club" mentality (IBP,
Nov 1992, 23).
Whereas relations with Australia
were at times difficult, those with
France were warm and positive. Prime
Minister Korman's delegation returned
from a visit to France in May, as the
government newspaper put it, with "its
pockets full" of undertakings to pro-
vide aid (vw, 30 May 1992,10-11).
France wrote off the debts owed to it
by Vanuatu, reestablished a substantial
aid program, and undertook to send an
ambassador to reside in Port Vila, fill-
ing a post left vacant since the expul-
sion of the last incumbent in October
1987 for alleged political interference
(allegations that were later shown to be
unfounded).
France's aid initiatives included edu-
cational aid to support the study of
French, assistance with the surveillance
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of Vanuatu's exclusive economic zone,
and the provision, in part in coopera-
tion with New Zealand, of television to
Vanuatu. While pleased to see bilateral
relations return to normal and keen to
see a more equitable balance between
the Anglophone and Francophone edu-
cational systems, the socialist govern-
ment in Paris proceeded carefully. In
discussions with Vanuatu's leaders
French representatives emphasized that
there were limits to the amount of aid
France would be able to provide and
on the extent to which France wished
to become involved in Vanuatu's
affairs. It is not certain whether a con-
servative French government would
show similar caution.
France's improved relations with the
island countries, following the negotia-
tion in mid-1988 of an interim settle-
ment in New Caledonia, smoothed the
way for the Korman government to
participate in the Melanesian Spear-
head Group. On 29 July Vanuatu
hosted a special meeting of the group in
Vila, after earlier meetings had been
cancelled because of tensions between
Papua New Guinea and Solomon
Islands over the Bougainville secession-
ist crisis (PR, 30 July 1992, 1-2; 20
August 1992, 6; vw, I Aug 1992,7).
Vanuatu was able to play the role of
honest broker, encouraging a measure
of reconciliation between the adversa-
nes.
The question of the rights of tradi-
tionallandowners to land in the urban
areas of Port Vila and Luganville
(Santo Town) resurfaced in July when
the government offered compensation
payments to the people of the villages
concerned. (In May 1988 this issue had
helped spark rioting in Vila, with one
death and much damage). On Efate,
on which Vila is located, the village of
Erakor accepted the compensation
payment. The chief of Pango village
also accepted the payment, but was
criticized by some fellow villagers.
Some of the villagers claimed that the
sum offered was insufficient relative to
the funds allocated to Erakor and Hira,
while others argued that the lands
should be leased to the municipality,
rather than ceded permanently. This
view was also held in Hira village,
where the people refused the proposed
settlement and called for the payment
of rents under leasing arrangements
that would recognize their ancestral
claims to the land (vw, 25 July 1992, 6).
The Korman government drafted
legislation empowering the govern-
ment in certain circumstances to
acquire land from customary landown-
ers in return for compensation, in
order to encourage productive invest-
ment in agriculture. President Fred
Timakata refused to sign the legislation
on the grounds that it was potentially
in conflict with the constitution. Along
with other controversial draft legisla-
tion, including that providing for the
summary cancellation of business
licenses and that pertaining to the
organization of television and broad-
casting, it was referred to the chief jus-
tice for his adjudication (IBP, Oct 1992,
18). The chief justice ruled that the
land acquisition act was indeed consti-
tutional, but found that the other legis-
lation was not (PR, 16 Nov 1992, I).
In May the Vanuatu Christian
Council attacked polygamous prac-
tices, citing the numerous wives of sev-
enty-seven-year-old Jimmy Moli
Stephens, a leader of the abortive
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Espiritu Santo secession attempt in
1980, who was released from jail in
August 1991. However, the chief justice
noted that polygamy did not constitute
an offense under Vanuatu law. Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Justice
Sethy Regenvanu called for public
debate on the issue, to assist the gov-
ernment to consider whether to legis-
late to make polygamy illegal (vw, 9
May 1992, 6, 10).
In early December opposition leader
Donald Kalpokas was suspended from
parliament for one day on the grounds
that he had breached parliamentary
privilege by publishing, in his party's
newspaper, documents earlier tabled in
parliament that were critical of govern-
ment policy and of procedures during
the budget session (vw, 5 Dec 1992,1,
5; PR, 14 Dec 1992, 1-2). The suspen-
sion possibly reflected government irri-
tation with Kalpokas' budget reply
speech, in which he criticized the gov-
ernment for running a deficit, reducing
Vanuatu's reserves, increasing some
taxes and charges, and failing to attract
new investment. In addition, Kalpokas
had warned of what he saw as the dan-
ger of Vanuatu becoming "a puppet of
some businessmen or another country"
(PR, 14 Dec 1992,2).
Such criticisms were forgotten on 19
December when the coalition govern-
ment reached its first anniversary. At
the celebration to mark the occasion,
Prime Minister and Union of Moderate
Parties leader Korman praised coali-
tion parliamentarians and Vanuatu's
public servants for their support,
which he said had permitted the coali-
tion government to retain office despite
predictions that it would collapse
within six months. He added that his
government's initiatives had the sup-
port of the majority of the people, and
that his administration had room for
all educated and skilled citizens,
whether their educational background
was anglophone or francophone.
For his part, Deputy Prime Minister
Regenvanu, on behalf of the National
United Party group in the coalition
government, assured the prime minis-
ter of his party's continued support
(vw, 19 Dec 1992,1). At least for the
time being, divisions between anglo-
phone and francophone educated
ni-Vanuatu seemed less important, rel-
ative to regional affiliations and prag-
matic connections (see Henningham,
1989,188-189; Bonnemaison and
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